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On the robustness of equilibria in generalized aggregative games
Filippo Fabiani, Kostas Margellos and Paul J. Goulart
Abstract— We address the problem of assessing the robust-
ness of the equilibria in uncertain, multi-agent games. Specifi-
cally, we focus on generalized Nash equilibrium problems in ag-
gregative form subject to linear coupling constraints affected by
uncertainty with a possibly unknown probability distribution.
Within a data-driven context, we apply the scenario approach
paradigm to provide a-posteriori feasibility certificates for the
entire set of generalized Nash equilibria of the game. Then, we
show that assessing the violation probability of such set merely
requires to enumerate the constraints that “shape” it. For the
class of aggregative games, this results in solving a feasibility
problem on each active facet of the feasibility region, for which
we propose a semi-decentralized algorithm. We demonstrate
our theoretical results by means of an academic example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent decision making is an established paradigm to
model and solve problems involving multiple heterogeneous
(possibly selfish) agents with individual goals. Moreover,
as part of the same population, such entities interact and
potentially share common resources or compete for them,
giving rise to a noncooperative setup. In this context, equi-
librium solution concepts based on game theory and, in
particular, generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs)
[1], provide a framework that encompasses many control
engineering problems, e.g., communication and networks [2],
[3], automated driving and traffic control [4], [5], smart grids
and demand-side management [6], [7], [8].
However, Nash equilibria are typically formalized in
games with complete information, i.e., where the main
ingredients (agents’ cost functions and strategies, local and
coupling constraints) are fully deterministic. Apparently, this
might suggest a conceptual shift when dealing with real-
world applications, since the latter are strongly affected by
the presence of uncertainty, and therefore traditional equilib-
rium notions may no longer be appropriate. This motivates to
seek for robust GNEP reformulations, suitably accompanied
by tailored equilibrium solution definitions.
By the pioneering work in [9], the literature on robust
game theory divides into two main directions that depend on
the available information (or working assumptions) around
the uncertain parameter. Specifically, several results deal
with uncertainty characterized by specific models of either
their probability distribution [10], [11], or the geometry of
its support set [12], [13], [14]. Conversely, there has been
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a recent development of data-driven (or distribution-free)
robust approaches, see, e.g., [15], [16], [17].
Within this data-driven context, the main results of the
aforementioned papers characterize the robustness of equi-
libria to unseen realizations of the uncertain parameter by
leveraging on the scenario approach paradigm [18]. Orig-
inally conceived to provide a-priori feasibility guarantees
associated with the optimal solution to an uncertain convex
optimization problem [19], the scenario theory has been
recently extended by means of an a-posteriori assessment of
the feasibility risk to nonconvex decision-making problems
[20]. In a nutshell, the scenario theory establishes that the ro-
bustness of the solution to a given uncertain decision-making
problem shall be assessed by solving an approximated, yet
computationally tractable, problem that is built upon a finite
number of observed realizations of the uncertainty.
We aim at bridging the multi-agent generalized game
theory with the data-driven scenario paradigm, in order to
compute generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) with quan-
tifiable robustness properties in a distribution-free fashion.
Specifically, we focus on the broad class of GNEPs in ag-
gregative setting (§II), where the cost function of each agent
depends on the average behaviour of the whole population
and the strategies are coupled by means of (affine) coupling
constraints affected by uncertainty with a possibly unknown
probability distribution. Here, we contextualize and apply the
probabilistic results in [20] to provide a-posteriori feasibility
certificates to the entire set of variational generalized Nash
equilibria (v-GNE), a popular subset of GNE [21]. Compared
with the literature on robust data-driven game theory, our
contributions can be summarized as follows.
• Along the direction of [17], we focus on the entire set
of equilibria, implicitly relaxing the assumption on the
uniqueness of the equilibrium postulated in [16];
• We extend the results in [15], [17] providing a-posteriori
robustness certificates for the set of GNE rather than
for the feasible set or Nash equilibria without coupling
constraints. We also show that the resulting bounds are
less conservative (§III);
• The obtained probabilistic guarantees rely on the notion
of support subsample, a key concept of the scenario
approach theory. To compute these support subsamples
we show that it is merely required to enumerate the
constraints that “shape” the set of GNE. An explicit
representation of the unknown set of equilibria is there-
fore not needed (§III);
• For the considered class of GNEPs, we propose a
structure-preserving, semi-decentralized algorithm to
compute the number of minimal irreducible support
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subsamples with respect to (w.r.t.) the set of GNE (§IV).
Finally, we validate the proposed theoretical results on an
illustrative example (§V).
Notation: N and R denote the set of natural and real
numbers, respectively. For vectors v1, . . . , vN ∈ Rn and
I = {1, . . . , N}, we denote v := (v>1 , . . . , v>N )> =
col((vi)i∈I) and v−i := (v>1 , . . . , v
>
i−1, v
>
i+1, . . . , v
>
N )
> =
col((vj)j∈I\{i}). With a slight abuse of notation, we also
use v = (vi,v−i). Given a matrix A ∈ Rm×n, A> denotes
its transpose, while for A ∈ Rn×n, A  0 (< 0) implies
that A is symmetric and positive (semi)-definite. For a given
set S ⊆ Rn, bdry(S) denotes its boundary. If S is closed
and convex, the normal cone of S evaluated at some x
is the set-valued mapping NS : Rn → 2Rn , defined as
NS(x) := {d ∈ Rn | d>(y − x) ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ S} if
x ∈ S, NS(x) := ∅ otherwise. A mapping F : Rn → Rn is
monotone if (F (x)−F (y))>(x−y) ≥ 0 for all x,y ∈ Rn.
C1 is the class of continuously differentiable functions.
II. MATHEMATICAL SETUP AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We start by formalizing the data-driven, uncertain game
considered. Then, we mathematically define the problem
addressed, and finally recall some key results for the class
of v-GNE characterizing GNEPs in aggregative form.
A. Aggregative game formulation
We consider a noncooperative, multi-agent game whose
N players are indexed by the set I := {1, . . . , N}. Let
xi ∈ Rni be the decision vector of the i-th player, locally
constrained to a set Xi ⊆ Rni . In this context, each player
aims at minimizing a predefined cost function Ji : Rn → R,
n :=
∑
i∈I ni, while satisfying a set of coupling constraints
among the agents affected by the realization of an uncertain
vector δ, encoded by the set Xδ ⊆ Rn. Specifically, δ takes
values in the set ∆ ⊆ R`, endowed with a σ-algebra D and
distributed according to P, a possibly unknown probability
measure over D. This results in the following family of
mutually coupled optimization problems:
∀i ∈ I :
{
min
xi∈Xi
Ji(xi,x−i)
s.t. (xi,x−i) ∈ Xδ, δ ∈ ∆.
For computational purposes, hereinafter we consider each
cost function to be in aggregative form and quadratic, while
Xδ is a polyhedral set for every realization of δ, i.e.,
Ji :=
1
2x
>
i Qixi + (
1
N
∑
j∈I\{i} Ci,jxj + qi)
>xi, ∀i ∈ I,
Xδ := {x ∈ Rn | A(δ)x ≤ b(δ)}, ∀δ ∈ ∆,
where Qi  0, Ci,j ∈ Rni×nj for all (i, j) ∈ I2, qi ∈
Rni , while A : ∆ → Rm×n and b : ∆ → Rm. In view of
the considered structure, it follows immediately that every
Ji(·,x−i) is a convex function of class C1, for any x−i ∈
R(n−ni), for all i ∈ I. Then, given the linear structure of
Xδ , we note that it can be equivalently defined by the set
of inequalities Ai(δ)xi +
∑
j∈I\{i}Aj(δ)xj ≤ b(δ), with
Ai : ∆ → Rm×ni , for all i ∈ I and for all δ ∈ ∆. For the
remainder, we postulate the following assumption.
Standing Assumption 1: For all i ∈ I, Xi ⊆ Rni is a
polytopic set. 
To conclude, we note that the polytopic set encompassing
all deterministic, local constraints X := ∏i∈I Xi, can also
be rewritten in compact form as X := {x ∈ Rn | Hx ≤ h},
for some H and h obtained by concatenating the matrices
and vectors that define the local constraint sets, Xi.
B. Scenario-based GNEP
The noncooperative game considered directly falls within
the set of jointly convex GNEPs [1, Def. 2], and we
consider a data driven approach to asses the robustness of
a set of equilibria to such game. Specifically, let δK :=
{δ(k)}k∈K = {δ(1), . . . , δ(K)} ∈ ∆K be a finite collection of
K ∈ N ∪ {0} independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
samples of δ, K := {1, 2, . . . ,K}, hereinafter referred to
as K-multisample. The scenario-based GNEP Γ is defined
as the tuple Γ := (I, (Xi)i∈I , (Ji)i∈I , δK), encoded by the
following family of optimization problems:
∀i∈I :
 minxi∈Xi
1
2x
>
i Qixi + (
1
N
∑
j∈I\{i} Ci,jxj + qi)
>xi
s.t. A(δ(k))x ≤ b(δ(k)), for all k ∈ K.
(1)
For any δ(k) ∈ δK , define the set Xδ(k) := {x ∈ Rn |
A(δ(k))x ≤ b(δ(k))}, while XKi (x−i) := {xi ∈ Xi |
(xi,x−i) ∈ ∩k∈KXδ(k)} and XK := ∩k∈KXδ(k) ∩ X . We
consider the following notion of equilibrium for Γ.
Definition 1: Let δK ∈ ∆K be any K-multisample. The
collective vector of strategies x∗ ∈ XK is a GNE of Γ in (1)
if, for all i ∈ I,
Ji(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ min
yi∈XKi (x∗−i)
Ji(yi,x
∗
−i).

Clearly, given the dependence on the set of K realizations
δK ∈ δK , any equilibrium of Γ is a random variable itself.
Now, let Ωδ be the set of equilibria induced by δ ∈ ∆.
In the spirit of [17, Def. 4], we investigate the violation
probability of the set of equilibria of a scenario-based GNEP,
according to the definition given next.
Definition 2: The violation probability of a set of GNE,
Ω, is defined as
V (Ω) := P{δ ∈ ∆ | Ω 6⊆ Ωδ}. (2)

Specifically, the random variable V (Ω) encodes the ro-
bustness of the set Ω to the uncertain parameter δ, i.e., given
any reliability parameter  ∈ (0, 1), we say that Ω is -
robust if V (Ω) ≤ . Here, the condition Ω 6⊆ Ωδ means
that, once δ is drawn, at least one element in Ω is not
an equilibrium any more. Thus, along the lines of [20], by
relying on the observations of the uncertain parameter, i.e.,
the K-multisample δK , our goal is to evaluate the violation
probability of the set of equilibria ΩK . For the remainder, we
restrict the set ΩK to correspond to the set of v-GNE of the
scenario-based GNEP (1), as described in the next section.
C. Characterization of v-GNE
A popular subset of GNE of a given game Γ is the one
of v-GNE, characterized as the set of equilibria providing
“larger social stability” [21, §5]. Specifically, the set of v-
GNE corresponds to the set of collective strategies that solve
the variational inequality associated with the scenario-based
GNEP in (1). Thus, given the K-multisample δK , the set of
v-GNE coincides with the solution set to VI(XK , F ), where
XK is the feasible set and F : Rn → Rn is the so-called
game mapping, constructed by stacking the partial derivatives
of Ji, i.e., F (x) := col((∇xiJi(xi,x−i))i∈I), given by
ΩK := {x ∈ XK | (y − x)>F (x) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ XK}.
In our aggregative setting with quadratic cost functions,
the game mapping turns out to be affine in the collective
vector of strategies x, i.e., F (x) = Mx + q, where M ∈
Rn×n and q ∈ Rn are defined as:
M :=

Q1
1
NC1,2 · · · 1NC1,N
1
NC2,1 Q2 · · · 1NC2,N
...
...
. . .
...
1
NCN,1
1
NCN,2 · · · QN
, q :=

q1
q2
...
qN
 .
Standing Assumption 2: The mapping F : Rn → Rn is
monotone. 
We remark that an affine mapping is monotone if and only
if (M+M>) < 0. This can be guaranteed by, e.g., assuming
equivalent bilateral interactions among agents, Ci,j = Cj,i,
for all (i, j) ∈ I2 (in addition to Qi  0, for all i ∈ I).
Now, we recall some results available in the literature
on affine variational inequalities, which will be key in the
remainder of the paper. Specifically, let us consider first the
game Γ in the absence of the coupling constraints, and let
us focus on the (deterministic) Nash equilibrium problem
(NEP) associated to (1) with XK = X , which reads as
∀i∈I : min
xi∈Xi
1
2x
>
i Qixi+(
1
N
∑
j∈I\{i} Ci,jxj+qi)
>xi. (3)
The set of variational Nash equilibria to such NEP, namely
Ω0 := Ωδ(0) , coincides with the set of solutions to a linearly
constrained, affine variational inequality problem, and hence
is characterized by the following lemma that combines [22,
Lemma 2.4.14, Th. 2.4.15], [23, Lemma 1, Th. 2].
Lemma 1: Let M < 0. Then, the following statements
hold true:
(i) Ω0 is a bounded polyhedral set;
(ii) There exist a vector c ∈ Rn and a constant d ≥ 0 such
that, for all x ∈ Ω0, (M+M>)x = c and x>Mx = d;
(iii) Let ω(x) := miny∈X y>(Mx+q), and let P := {x ∈
X | ω(x)− (d+ q>x) ≥ 0}. Then
Ω0 := {x ∈ P | (M +M>)x = c}.

By noticing that P is a polyhedral set, roughly speaking
the set of Nash equilibria Ω0 contains the feasible strategies
that span (M + M>), and it is characterized by the two
invariants c and d. We note that, given any δK ∈ ∆K ,
Lemma 1(iii) allows to introduce coupling constraints, and
characterize the set of v-GNE, ΩK . Specifically, we have
ΩK := {x ∈ Rn | (M +M>)x = c} ∩ PK , (4)
where PK := {x ∈ XK | ω(x) − (d + q>x) ≥ 0}, and the
function ω(·) is restricted to the feasible set XK ⊆ X , which
accounts for the coupling constraints. Finally, we recall that
x∗ ∈ ΩK ⇐⇒ −F (x∗) = −(Mx∗ + q) ∈ NXK (x∗).
Remark 1: In view of Standing Assumption 2, we have
M < 0. When M  0, the mapping F is strictly mono-
tone and hence the scenario-based GNEP admits a unique
equilibrium that, in general, can not be characterized as in
Lemma 1. The results showed next focus on the general case,
i.e., F monotone mapping with M < 0, while the other case
follows straightforwardly. In fact, if M  0, Lemma 2 and
Theorem 1 below still hold, by requiring only Assumption 1
to be imposed, thus relaxing Assumption 2. 
III. PROBABILISTIC FEASIBILITY FOR A SET OF GNE
In this section, we first recall some key concepts and
results of the scenario approach theory, and then discuss how
to extend them to a set-oriented framework. Successively, we
provide bounds on the violation probability related to the set
of equilibria of the scenario-based GNEP Γ in (1).
A. A weak connection among sets of GNE
Recent developments in the scenario approach literature
have led to a-posteriori probabilistic feasibility guarantees
for abstract decision problems [20] (see Theorem 1 therein),
which is based on the two following conditions:
(i) For all K ∈ N ∪ {0} and all δK ∈ ∆K , the decision
of an abstract problem is unique;
(ii) The decision taken while observing K realizations
shall be consistent for all the collected situations k ∈ K
[20, Assumption 1].
Specifically, [20, Th. 1] studies the distribution of V (θ∗K),
where θ∗K is the unique solution to the abstract decision prob-
lem computed after observing K realizations of the uncertain
parameter, and finds a suitable (probabilistic) bound 1 − β
guaranteeing that V (θ?K) ≤  holds, for some β ∈ (0, 1).
Since the randomized GNEP in (1) is a decision problem,
a key step to apply the probabilistic feasibility bound in [20,
Th. 1] to the entire set of GNE is to extend the conditions
above to embrace the scenario-based generalized aggregative
game Γ. To this end, in view of Definition 2, we mimic the
steps made in [20] by focusing on set-oriented decisions.
In the scenario-based GNEP considered, our decision is a
set and, specifically, we let correspond to the set of equilibria,
ΩK . Then, in view of item (i), guaranteeing the uniqueness
of the set of equilibria for Γ in (1) is implicit since, for any
K-multisample δK ∈ ∆K , there is naturally a single set of
equilibria ΩK , which is a nonempty, compact and convex
set. This follows immediately from [22, Th. 2.3.5], as XK is
a bounded polyhedral set and F is a continuous, monotone
mapping. Therefore, let us consider a single-valued mapping
X
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Fig. 1: Schematic two-dimensional representation of the type
of degenerate cases that, due to Assumption 2, can only
happen with probability zero. In this case, Ω0, . . . ,ΩK−1
are singletons, however, if the K-th sample overlaps with
the affine set in (4) (assuming b(δ(K)) = c = 0), it might
generate additional equilibria belonging to bdry(XK), as
formalized in the proof of Lemma 2. Thus, ΩK is no longer
a singleton and may lie entirely on the bdry(XK).
ΘK : ∆
K → 2X that, given a specific set of realizations
δK , returns the set of equilibria to the scenario-based GNEP
in (1), i.e., ΩK := ΘK(δ(1), . . . , δ(K)) = ΘK(δK). When
K = 0, Θ0 has no argument, and it is to be understood that
it returns the set of equilibria of the deterministic NEP in
(3). In view of item (ii) above, we envision the following
set-oriented counterpart of [20, Ass. 1].
“For all K ∈ N and for all δK ∈ ∆K , ΘK(δK) ⊆ Ωδ(k) ,
for all k ∈ K ∪ {0}.”
In the proposed analogy, we let the admissible decision
for the situation represented by δ to coincide with the set of
equilibria Ωδ , which is clearly a subset of the feasible set Xδ
shaped by the uncertain parameter. Next, we show that the
above set-oriented counterpart of [20, Ass. 1] holds true for
the scenario-based GNEP in (1). Given the specific structure
of the problem addressed, in view of Lemma 1, we postulate
the following assumptions on the set of equilibria.
Assumption 1: For all K ∈ N∪{0}, ΩK∩Xδ is nonempty,
for any δ ∈ ∆. 
Assumption 2: For all x ∈ Rn, P{δ ∈ ∆ | A(δ)x−b(δ) =
(M +M>)x− c} = 0. 
Nonemptiness of ΩK is reasonable as we aim at quan-
tifying robustness to unseen scenarios, while Assumption 2
is a non-degeneracy condition often imposed in the scenario
approach literature [24, Ass. 6]. It rules out, indeed, the pos-
sibility that a new affine coupling constraint corresponding
to δ overlaps with the equilibria subspace (M +M>)x− c,
allowing such situations to occur with probability zero (see
Fig. 1 for a graphical representation). This requirement is
satisfied for all probability distributions P that admit a
density function. Pictorially, generating samples gives rise
to shared constraints that “shape” the set of equilibria, as
X
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Fig. 2: The set of GNE, ΩK , can be “shaped” by the set
of linear constraints, Xδ(k) , k ∈ K. Specifically, by referring
to Definition 3, the labelled dashed orange lines define the
support subsample for δK w.r.t. to XK , which in this case
correspond to the the active samples that shape the feasibility
region. Their intersections in X are denoted by orange dots.
represented in Fig. 2. With this in mind, we are now in
the position to prove the main result that links the set of
GNE of (1) across the samples scenarios, thus establishing
(probabilistically) the set-oriented counterpart of [20, Ass. 1].
Lemma 2: Let Assumption 1 and 2 hold true. Then, for
all K ∈ N and for all δK ∈ ∆K , ΘK(δK) ⊆ Ωδ(k) almost
surely (a.s.), for all k ∈ K ∪ {0}. 
Proof: Given any K ∈ N and any associated K-
multisample δK ∈ ∆K , let k¯ be an arbitrary index belonging
to K. The mapping Θk¯(δ(1), . . . , δ(k¯)) returns the set of equi-
libria Ωk¯, while once drawn the (k¯ + 1)-th sample, we have
Ωk¯+1 := Θk¯+1(δ
(1), . . . , δ(k¯), δ(k¯+1)). Note that, in view
of Assumption 1, both sets are guaranteed to be nonempty
and are of the form defined in (4), i.e., generated by the
intersection between an affine and a bounded polyhedral set.
We show now that Ωk¯+1 ⊆ Ωk¯, and then the statement will
follow by induction over k¯ ∈ K by noticing further that
Θ0 =: Ω0 ⊇ Ω1 ⊇ . . . ⊇ ΩK =: ΘK(δK).
On one hand, any x∗ that is a GNE for Γ on Xk¯ and such
that x∗ ∈ Xδ(k¯+1) , also belongs to Ωk¯+1. To see this, recall
the definition of Ωk¯+1 in (4): the inclusion is clearly true
for the affine part, (M + M>)x∗ = c, while if x∗ ∈ Pk¯
and x∗ ∈ Xδ(k¯+1) , then x∗ ∈ Pk¯+1 in view of the structure
of ω(·), along with the convexity and compactness of each
set involved. Now, let Xk¯+1 := Xk¯ ∩ Xδ(k¯+1) . In view of
the properties of the normal cone, if there exists some GNE
x∗ such that x∗ ∈ Ωk¯+1, but x∗ /∈ Ωk¯, it must happen that
x∗ ∈ bdry(Ωk¯+1). In fact, −F (x∗) ∈ NXk¯+1 and −F (x∗) /∈
NXk¯ if and only if F (x∗) 6= {0}, and this is possible at the
boundary of Xk¯+1 only, which in view of the compactness
and convexity of each set corresponds to the boundary of
Ωk¯+1 (see also Fig. 1). Thus, Ωk¯+1 can be represented as the
union of two sets. Specifically, the first set gathers all those
points that were equilibria for the game with k¯-samples and
remain feasible for the constraint corresponding to k¯ + 1,
while the second one contains all those points that did not
belong to Ωk¯ and may lie on the boundary of Ωk¯+1, i.e.,
Ωk¯+1 = {x ∈ Xk¯+1 | x ∈ Ωk¯} ∪
{
x ∈ bdry(Xk¯+1) |
x /∈ Ωk¯, (y − x)>F (x) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ Xk¯+1
}
.
(5)
In view of Assumption 1, {x ∈ Xk¯+1 | x ∈ Ωk¯} ⊆ Ωk¯
is nonempty, for any Xδ(k¯+1) and k¯ ∈ K. Finally, it follows
that the second set in (5) is empty a.s., since it contains all
points that are on the boundary of Xk¯+1 and belong to the
affine set (M +M>)x = c which is of measure zero due to
Assumption 2, thus concluding the proof.
We finally remark again that Fig. 1 shows an example
where the second set in (5) would not be of measure zero.
B. A-posteriori probabilistic feasibility guarantees for ΩK
The following definition is at the core of scenario approach
theory and crucial for our subsequent developments.
Definition 3: [20, Def. 2] Given a K-multisample δK ∈
∆K , a support subsample S ⊆ δK is a p-tuple of elements
extracted from δK , i.e., S := {δ(k1), . . . , δ(kp)}, k1 < . . . <
kp, which gives the equilibria of the original sample, i.e.,
Θp(δ
(k1), . . . , δ(kp)) = ΘK(δ
(1), . . . , δ(K)).

Moreover, a support subsample S is said to be irreducible
if no further elements can be removed from S without
leaving the solution unchanged. With a slight abuse of
notation, in the remainder we will refer to the notion of
support subsample for δK ∈ ∆K w.r.t. either XK , or ΩK .
In general, an algorithm that determines a support sub-
sample can be defined as ΥK : δK → {k1, . . . , kp}, k1 <
. . . < kp, such that {δ(k1), . . . , δ(kp)} is a support subsample
for δK . Let us denote with sK := |ΥK(δK)| its cardinality.
Note that sk is a random variable itself as it depends on δK .
Thus, given any K-multisample δK ∈ ∆K , the following
result provides an a posteriori bound of the violation proba-
bility in (2) for the entire set of equilibria, ΩK .
Theorem 1: Let Assumption 1 and 2 hold true, fix some
β ∈ (0, 1). Let ε : K ∪ {0} → [0, 1] be a function such that
ε(K) = 1,
K−1∑
h=0
(
K
h
)
(1− ε(h))K−h = β.
Then, for any ΘK , ΥK and probability P, it holds that
PK{δK ∈ ∆K | V (ΩK) > ε(sK)} ≤ β. (6)

Proof: By leveraging on Lemma 2, the proof follows
as a corollary of [20, Th. 1].
Remark 2: As evident from (6), to asses the robustness of
the set of equilibria ΩK , one does not need to dispose of a
Algorithm 1: Computation of the number of support
subsample for aggregative GNEPs
Initialization:
(S0.1) Set sK := 0, identify
AK := {k ∈ K | bdry(Xδ(k)) ∩ bdry(XK) 6= ∅}
(S0.2) Run Φ(δ0) to compute x0 ∈ X , set
d := x>0 Mx0 and c := (M +M
>)x0
Iteration (i ∈ AK):
(S1) Solve the feasibility problem:
min
(λ,x)∈Rn+1
0
s.t. h>λ+ q>x+ d ≤ 0,
H>λ−M>x+ c+ q = 0,
λ ≥ 0,x ∈ XK ∩ bdry(Xδ(i)).
(7)
(S2) If ∃(λ,x) that solves (7), set sK := sK + 1
full characterization of ΩK , namely an algorithm ΘK(·), but
rather the number of support subsamples sK , computed by
means of Υ(·). In the next section, we provide a possible
algorithm Υ(·) for the scenario-based GNEP in (1). 
The following result provides an upper bound for V (ΩK).
Proposition 1: Given any K ∈ N∪{0} and δK ∈ ∆K , let
sK and vK be the number of (possibly irreducible) support
subsample for δK , evaluated w.r.t. ΩK and XK , respectively.
Then, sK ≤ vK , and therefore V (ΩK) ≤ V (XK). 
Proof: Given the linearity of both local and coupling
constraints defining the feasible set of the game Γ in (1),
it follows from Definition 3 that some sample δ(k) is of
support for δK w.r.t. XK if Xδ(k) is active on bdry(XK),
i.e., bdry(Xδ(k)) ∩ bdry(XK) 6= ∅. On the other hand, δ(k)
is of support w.r.t. ΩK if bdry(Xδ(k)) ∩ ΩK 6= ∅ (see Fig. 2
for a graphic illustration). Since, in general, ΩK ⊆ XK =
∩k∈KXδ(k)∩X , those samples that are of support for δK w.r.t.
ΩK , are of support w.r.t. XK , but not viceversa. Therefore,
sK ≤ vK . Finally, since ε(·) in Theorem 1 is an increasing
function, we have V (ΩK) ≤ V (XK) as desired.
Remark 3: The result in Proposition 1 implies that, given
the same K-multisample δK ∈ ∆K , (6) provides tighter
bounds compared to [17, Cor. 7], since we focus on the set
of equilibria rather than on the entire feasibility set. 
IV. COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS
Next, we propose a structure-preserving, semi-
decentralized algorithm to compute the number of support
subsample w.r.t. ΩK . In view of Theorem 1, sK is a crucial
quantity to assess the risk associated with the entire set ΩK .
Specifically, by leveraging on Lemma 1, in the case
of GNEP in aggregative setting the computation of the
(minimal) number of support subsample w.r.t. ΩK reduces
to solving a feasibility problem on the augmented space
Rn+1. An outline of a complete procedure can be found
in Algorithm 1, where, given any K-multisample δK ∈ ∆K ,
Φ : ∆K → 2XK can be seen as any iterative algorithm avail-
able in the literature that allows to compute an equilibrium
solution to the aggregative GNEP in (1), e.g., [25], [26], [27].
Specifically, while (S0.1) allows to identify the active facets
of the convex polytope XK [28], (S0.2) requires to solve the
NEP in (3), here identified by δ0 = ∅. In this way, computing
an equilibrium of the NEP allows us to define the quantities
d and c, which characterize every point in Ω0 (and therefore
of ΩK), also shaping the feasibility set in (7). Successively,
(S1) requires to solve a feasibility problem on each active
facet identified at (S0.1), where x ∈ XK ∩ bdry(Xδ(i))
translates into an equality constraint in view of the affine
constraints involved, while (S2) increments the counter sK
in case the problem at (S1) is feasible. We next state and
prove the main result related with Algorithm 1.
Proposition 2: Let Assumption 1 and 2 hold true. For
any K ∈ N and δK ∈ ∆K , Algorithm 1 returns s∗K , the
cardinality of the minimal, irreducible support subsample δK
w.r.t. the entire set of equilibria, ΩK . 
Proof: First note that, in the setting of the scenario-
based GNEP in (1), AK denotes the minimal, irreducible
support subsample for δK w.r.t. the convex polytope XK .
Then, by following the consideration adopted within the
proof of Proposition 1, i.e., every δ(i), i ∈ AK , is of support
also w.r.t. ΩK if and only if bdry(Xδ(i)) ∩ ΩK 6= ∅. To
check this condition for each δ(i) it is sufficient to compute a
solution (if one exists) on the active region of XK associated
with Xδ(i) . Since, in general, ΩK ⊆ Ω0 (both bounded
polyhedral sets), in view of Lemma 1 every equilibrium
solution in ΩK is characterized by: i) the invariance property
with parameter c, which is computed, together with d, for
the NEP, i.e., (1) with no coupling constraints; ii) shall lie
into PK , defined in (4). Let us consider now the Lagrange
dual optimization problem associated with ω(x) given bymaxλ≥0 − h
>λ
s.t. H>λ+Mx+ q = 0.
(8)
In view of weak duality [29], x ∈ PK (recall the definition
of PK below (4)) if there exists some λ ≥ 0 such that (8) is
feasible and −h>λ− (d+ q>x) ≥ 0 is satisfied as ω(x) ≥
−h>λ for any such λ. Thus, by combining the equality in
(8) and (M +M>)x = c to obtain the second constraint in
(7), computing an equilibrium on the boundary of an active
constraint XK∩bdry(Xδ(i)) reduces to finding a feasible pair
(λ,x) for the convex optimization problem in (7). Finally,
sK increases only if such a feasibility problem has a solution,
excluding all those samples Xδ(i) that does not intersect ΩK .
The minimality follows as a consequence of the fact that AK
is the minimal support subsample for the polytope XK .
Remark 4: As tailored for GNEP in aggregative form,
Algorithm 1 requires to run the adopted iterative procedure
Φ(δK) once, and to solve (7) by means of some distributed
algorithm |AK |-times, with |AK | ≤ K. This clearly im-
proves w.r.t. the greedy algorithms proposed in [20, §II] and
[16, §III], which would require running Φ(δK) K-times. 
Fig. 3: Size of ΩK = Ω0 ∩XK , normalized with the one of
Ω0, as a function of the number of samples K. The solid line
represents the average of |Ω0 ∩XK |/|Ω0| over 10 numerical
experiments, while the shaded area the standard deviation.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We choose an academic example to illustrate the intro-
duced theoretical results. Specifically, we consider a two-
player GNEP in aggregative form with scalar decision vari-
ables and quadratic structure, i.e., we consider N = 2
agents, with cost functions J1(x1, x2) := 12x
2
1 + (1− x2)x1,
J2(x1, x2) :=
1
2x
2
2− (1 +x1)x2, and Xi := {xi ∈ R | |xi| ≤
2}, i = 1, 2. Here, x := col(x1, x2), and
M :=
[
1 −1
−1 1
]
, q :=
[
1
−1
]
,
which guarantee the monotonicity of the game mapping F
as M + M> < 0. Thus, it turns out that Ω0 := {x ∈ X |
x2 − x1 − 1 = 0}, X := X1 × X2, and since M < 0,
every x∗ ∈ Ω0 is characterized by invariants c := col(−2, 2)
and d := 1 as in Lemma 1. We assume each set Xδ be
defined by a random halfspace of the form δ1x1 + δ2x2 ≤
δ3. Moreover, we assume that δ := col(δ1, δ2, δ3) follows a
uniform distribution with support ∆ := [−4, 4] × [−4, 4] ×
[4, 10] ⊆ R3, shaping the feasible set Xδ ∩ X .
Then, given any K-multisample, the structure of ΩK
enable us to estimate |ΩK | as the length of the interval
(M +M>)x = c contained in XK , i.e., |Ωk| = |Ω0 ∩ XK |.
Thus, Fig. 3 shows the average length of ΩK over 10
numerical experiments, normalized w.r.t. the one of Ω0. Here,
ΩK shrinks as the number of samples grows, numerically
supporting Lemma 2. Note that, in view of the structure of
the support ∆, as K increases, the standard deviation of the
uncertain parameter δ narrows around the average.
We now compare the theoretical bounds provided in
Theorem 1, by using β = 10−6, with an empirical estimate
of the violation probability in (2). To this end, we generate
K = 100 samples to obtain Ω100 in Fig. 4 and, after
gridding the set of equilibria with granularity 0.01, we
compute the empirical violation of probability for each grid-
Fig. 4: Sets obtained after drawing 100 samples. The green
dots x∗,1 and x∗,2 are the extrema of the set of GNE, Ω100,
while the orange dashed lines confine the feasible set, X100.
Fig. 5: Comparison between theoretical and empirical viola-
tion probability for Ω100. After gridding Ω100 with granular-
ity 0.01, the empirical violation probability is evaluated for
each grid-point against 104 new samples.
point against 104 new realizations of δ. The theoretical
violation level, encoded by the function ε(·) is analytically
obtained by splitting β evenly among the 100 terms within
the summation defined in Theorem 1. Given the structure of
the problem, the family of equilibria in Ω100 corresponds
to an interval, which can be parametrized by the points
(1 − µ)x∗,1 + µx∗,2, for µ ∈ [0, 1], where x∗,1 and x∗,2
are the extrema of Ω100 (see Fig. 4). As reported in Fig. 5,
while the theoretical bound in (6), determined by s100 = 2,
provides an equivalent feasibility certificate for all the points
in Ω100, the empirical violation probability is generally lower
and attains the highest values close to x∗,1 and x∗,2. This
is anticipated as closer to the boundary of the set higher
probability of violation is expected.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The scenario approach applied to robust game theory
provides a numerically tractable framework to compute GNE
with quantifiable robustness properties in a distribution-free
fashion. In the specific case of a GNEP in aggregative form,
we allow assessing the robustness properties of the entire
set of generalized equilibria, thus relaxing the requirement
for imposing a Nash equilibrium uniqueness assumption as
typically performed in the literature. This merely requires
to enumerate the active coupling constraints that intersect
such set. Further extensions to other classes of GNEPs and
potential games, along with different algorithms to compute
the number of support subsamples, a crucial quantity for the
feasibility certificate, constitute topics of future work.
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